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ABSTRACT: Given the encroaching, seemingly pernicious backlash against Alain Badiou’s 
thinking, which appears partly motivated by the bad faith of “philosophical” rivalries, this 
essay aims to argue in favour of the ongoing and authentically philosophical stakes of Badiou’s 
ontology. At the same time the essay attempts to highlight the methodological difficulties 
Badiou encounters in attempting to reconcile an intrinsic ontology as the dominant condition 
of philosophy, with a philosophy of the event. The essay concludes by speculating on the 
“unbound”, “unconditioned” potential of this two-headed philosophy.   
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I wish to begin this essay with an example. Readers familiar with Alain Badiou’s work 
may notice a difficulty with it. I will address this difficulty at the end. For the moment, 
at the risk of misleading and mis-representing Badiou’s work to those less familiar with 
it, I politely ask for their indulgence. Here is the example, which takes the form of a 
statement: “O Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo?”2
                                                     
1 I would like to thank Justin Clemens and Ray Brassier for commenting on previous drafts of this essay. 
 As is so often the case 
in “young love”, Juliet, who mouths these words alone on her balcony, barely knows 
Romeo, although the very next day they will be married. Although neither is aware of 
it yet their passing acquaintance has already triggered a set of consequences which in 
scope and pure intensity will surpass them both. The outcome will be calamitous for 
all concerned. But it is also fair to speculate that Love itself, in the wake of this 
prodigal encounter, is destined never to be quite the same again. 
2 Shakespeare references are taken from Romeo and Juliet, ed. B. Gibbons, Arden Shakespeare, 2nd 
Edition, 1980.  
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I hope this metaphor will serve to illustrate the sizable impact of Alain Badiou’s 
intervention in contemporary philosophy. Given the encroaching and seemingly 
pernicious backlash against his thinking, no doubt partly motivated by the bad faith of 
“philosophical” rivalries,3
I: ALIEN ENCOUNTER 
 hopefully this essay can serve to remind readers of the 
ongoing and authentically philosophical stakes of Badiou’s ontology.  
In the late 90s and early 2000s, when Badiou first made contact with his Anglophone 
public, it is no exaggeration to say that the effect was somewhat monstrous. After all, 
here was a thinker who straddled the French post-War currents of existentialism, 
Marxism and the philosophy of mathematics; who claimed to have devised the most 
radical materialism since Lucretius; who declared that “ontology = mathematics”; 
who drew a direct parallel between his magnum opus Being and Event and Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit and, not content with that, then announced his intention to write 
a new Science of Logic. Initial encounters with Badiou’s remarkable yet highly 
provocative “alien”4
Today things are different. “Badiou’s philosophy” is no longer Badiou’s 
philosophy. Badiou, one might say, has taken leave of his own system. This is perhaps 
the highest compliment one could pay a living philosopher (who has spawned a “live 
theory”
 philosophy tended to inspire readings such that, in the published 
work of his first Anglophone disciples, the names of Althusser, Beckett, Deleuze, 
Lacan, Mao, Marx and Sartre were repeated reference points. Although Badiou’s 
philosophy is unfamiliar enough to resist easy categorisation, clearly it brings with it a 
formidable intellectual reputation.  
5) whereby the consequences of (his) thinking become absolutely incalculable 
for thinking. If “Badiou” has become a philosophical signifier then today it’s no longer 
a question of the faithful reception, transmission and assimilation of “his” ideas. 
Instead it’s a matter of philosophical invention, and we shouldn’t underestimate the 
extent to which Badiou’s many exacting readers have contributed to it.6
                                                     
3 One article and two books stand out, the latter of which are yet to be published in English: R. L. 
Nirenberg and D. Nirenberg ‘Badiou’s Number: A Critique of Mathematics as Ontology’ in Critical 
Inquiry (forthcoming); Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, Après Badiou, Paris, Grasset, 2011; François Laruelle, Anti-
Badiou, Paris, Kimé, 2011.   
 For this 
4 I borrow the term from Ray Brassier, Alien Theory. The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter. PhD 
thesis, Warwick University, UK, 2001. 
5 The aptly-named title of a series of monographs published by Continuum which includes a study of 
Badiou by Oliver Feltham.   
6 Among the most interesting of several Badiou-inspired philosophical inventors are Ray Brassier and 
Quentin Meillassoux, whose respective works I shall briefly consider in what follows. 
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reason there is no need to introduce Badiou’s work or chart its evolution.7 Instead I 
want to address what I regard as the most urgent philosophical consequences of that 
work – which of course is ongoing – but which for the sake of brevity I will confine to 
Being and Event8
Let us now consider the title of this essay, “Wherefore art thou philosophy?” 
which may be a useful way of reflecting on that which philosophy, in Badiou’s sense of 
the word, implies. First and foremost, Badiou’s is a philosophical intervention in the 
sense that it marks a direct assault on the dominant paradigms in contemporary 
philosophy of post-Kantian relativism and anti-foundationalism. Like Louis Althusser, 
Badiou sees philosophy as objectless and contentless. In itself, philosophy has no 
object i.e. it is not a form of knowledge. Instead, philosophy is the struggle and 
“battleground” over its own discursive field. However, unlike Althusser for whom 
philosophy had a properly political field of application (the so-called “class struggle in 
theory”
 and the books and essays which have followed it. More than any other 
single work Being and Event, in its radical rethinking of the philosophical mission and 
status of ontology, purports to change the nature of philosophical practice itself.    
9
The a priori conditions of “situations” are what Badiou regards as the prerequisites 
of thinking and being. Badiou is in no way concerned, as was Kant, with unifying the 
rationalist and empirical paradigms of philosophy. Badiou’s supreme indifference to 
Kantian critique is presumably one of the reasons why Peter Osborne defines his 
philosophical project as neo-classic.
), Badiou insists on “desuturing” philosophy as such from any dominant 
discourse or practice, be it politics or art, mathematical science or love. Crucially, 
these are the only four such discourses or practices which Badiou will entertain as 
possible philosophical discourses, or “conditions” of philosophy. And they are possible 
in the sense of being contingent upon the coming about of “events”, the incalculable 
and non-provable supplements of “situations”.    
10 Since “thinking and being are the same”11
                                                     
7 Helpful book-length English introductions to Badiou’s work include: Jason Barker, Alain Badiou. A 
Critical Introduction. London, Pluto Press, 2002; Oliver Feltham, Alain Badiou: Live Theory. London, 
Continuum, 2008; Peter Hallward, Badiou. A Subject to Truth. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 
2003.     
 
philosophy can only inquire into its own conditions. “The world” or external reality is 
not an object for philosophy. Whereas, by complete contrast, the task of philosophical 
8 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. O. Feltham. London, Continuum, 2005. [Alain Badiou, L’Etre et 
l’Evénement. Paris, Seuil, 1988.] Page references to this work refer to both the English and (in brackets) 
French editions. 
9 See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. B. Brewster. London, New Left Books, 
1971. 
10 Peter Osborne, “Neo-classic: Alain Badiou’s Being and Event” in Radical Philosophy (142), 2007. 
11 Alain Badiou, ibid., p. 38 (p. 49) [Translation modified]. 
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invention, beyond that which merely “is”, is a far more open affair, and equivalent to 
the realms (“sites”) in which events occur. Badiou thus may be said to be practising a 
classical philosophy of sorts (though undoubtedly “Platonist”) in the sense that 
philosophy is devoted to the ontological question of “what is”; and a modern 
philosophy in the sense that philosophy, since Nietzsche, has been devoted to the 
aesthetics of pure creation. Interestingly, events also provide the sites from which 
truth (or singular “truths”) emerge, a fact which remains one of the most awkward 
questions for Badiou’s conception of philosophy.   
The question “what is philosophy?” – answered prosaically by Deleuze and 
Guattari as “the creation of concepts”12 – would thus appear less urgent, even 
irrelevant, for Badiou. Although he does provide us with a positive definition of 
philosophy – “the seizure of truths”13
II: WHY IS LOVE? 
 – the question for Badiou would appear to be 
not so much “what?” as “why philosophy?” Philosophy is nothing in itself. Indeed, 
such is the infinite ontological banality or “ordinary nature” of any given situation 
that questions of the meaning of life, God, existence or morality – Enlightenment 
questions still widely considered as the only ones worthy of philosophical reflection – 
attain no such privilege in Badiou. As far as thinking/being is concerned all we can 
say with certainty is “there is infinite multiplicity”, a fact which, as Pascal understood, 
didn’t so much attest to the supreme power of God as to the nothingness of the void.      
In our romantic example Juliet’s ontological question, posed in respect of her beloved 
Romeo, is equally far-reaching and potentially corrosive for common sense. Having 
met Romeo at a masquerade ball Juliet now faces a dilemma. But of course the 
meaning of her actual soliloquy is hardly straightforward and raises as many questions 
as it answers. “Wherefore art thou Romeo?” is not a question asked directly of Juliet’s 
beloved. Juliet speaks her “inner dialogue” believing she is alone. But would it 
somehow have helped the “starcross’d lovers” in their impossible courtship if Romeo 
were, as Juliet suggests, someone else? Are we being facetious here? Are we perhaps 
guilty in our analysis of taking Juliet’s words too literally when they are only meant as 
metaphors, or as dramatic plot devices? Not at all, since what we are always dealing 
with in “young” or “first love”, or with love in its “purest” form, is an intrinsic 
discourse. From her balcony Juliet is possessed by the question of how to pursue her 
love, which is Love tout court. There is no worldly consideration. “Wherefore art thou 
                                                     
12 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell. New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1996. 
13 See Alain Badiou, Conditions, trans. S. Corcoran. London, Continuum, 2009.  
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Romeo?” is the driving principle at the heart of this without care or concern, either 
for Juliet’s own state of mind, health or family name, nor for that of her beloved. Love 
itself is all that is at stake here, total and all-encompassing.    
We may pause at this point in order to remark that love in its intrinsic and “self-
reflexive” dimension recalls the Religion of Love which in the Elizabethan adaptation 
of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet was allegedly subverted on moral grounds. In 
contrast to such morality plays in which the law of social graces is transgressed, 
Francis X. Newman’s definition of amour courtois entails, “a love at once illicit and 
morally elevating, passionate and disciplined, humiliating and exalting, human and 
transcendent.”14 Amour courtois lies somewhere between sexual pleasure and neo-
Platonic love. It is a crusading sentiment serving love as idea, or as what Jacques 
Lacan refers to in his Seminar XVI, explicitly speaking of amour courtois, as “a poetic 
homage to sexual desire”.15 We will have cause to return briefly to the relationship 
between love and psychoanalysis, but let us propose for the moment, and taking 
Lacan’s readings of Plato as our guide, that love is the point where the mere fact of 
sexual difference is annulled.16
The pursuit of first love, then, is an intimate discipline indifferent to social custom; 
but also indifferent to the lover’s person. The statement “Wherefore art thou 
Romeo?” is indeed a lure in this sense, a metaphor or dramatic plot device, that is 
meant to attribute a specific gendered set of relations to a situation; to represent that 
situation for the audience, lecture us about the “inner workings” of these characters’ 
minds and, more importantly, how they ought to behave. However, in its bare 
ontological dimension perhaps Juliet’s question could also be “Wherefore art thou 
Juliet?” since love, or rather the subject of first love in this sense is indifferent to her 
empirical being. Indeed, we might wonder quite what role either Romeo or Juliet’s 
respective identities – chief among them their sexual identities as male and female – 
play in the Religion of Love thus conceived. “What’s in a name?” wonders Juliet, 
“That which we call a rose, By any other name would smell as sweet.”  
   
Is Romeo the real object of Juliet’s love? Or does her love, in the sense of being a 
pure intensity, a raw passion, surpass her beloved to the point of having no interest in 
his “actual person”? Granted the question of unicity is a rather awkward and insistent 
one from the history of philosophy, and the one which Badiou defines as the “void” 
                                                     
14 Francis X. Newman ed., The Meaning of Courtly Love. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1968, 
p.vii. 
15 Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire Livre XVI (1968-1969), D’un Autre à l’autre. Paris, Seuil, 2006.  
16 “The One” is Plato’s description of amorous unity in the Symposium. As for Lacan, as he states famously 
in his Seminar XX, “there is no such thing as a sexual relationship”, which is understood to mean that the 
relation between male and female resists a static or “symbolic” opposition.   
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(which in mathematical writing is noted: Ø) of his ontology. It is through the naming of 
the void set – “the set that has no element” – that Badiou manages to restrict the 
problem of (its) “unique” identity. The question is thus reversed. No longer need Juliet 
doubt the consistency of her heartfelt passion for her one and only Romeo i.e. her true 
love (“What’s in a name?”), since “Romeo” is the name for her heartfelt passion, 
rather than the “actual person” himself. And her heartfelt passion is an open-ended 
investigation, a subjective process, an experiment, rather than a mere domestic union 
with finite ends: “My love as deep; the more I give to thee, The more I have, for both 
are infinite.”  
A subjective process has no specific object(ive) and so love, as one such process, is 
never a question of being “out” of love. One is either in love or not in love. However, 
the question itself remains. (“To be or not to be,” in the words of Hamlet. “That is the 
question.”) Badiou’s ambitious claim in Being and Event which has implications for all 
such ontological statements – i.e. statements of “being” – is to announce that 
“ontology = mathematics”. The mathematics Badiou has in mind here is that of 
modern set theory, whose original revolutionary thinker was Georg Cantor.17
III: THE MARGIN OF PHILOSOPHY 
 For 
Badiou if mathematics is the discourse through which our fundamental understanding 
of “being” can be grasped as truth, then it is thanks to the “mathematico-logical 
revolution” of Cantor, Kurt Gödel, and Paul Cohen rather than the poetic ontology 
of Friedrich Hölderlin, Georg Trakl or Paul Celan. For Badiou this Cantorian 
revolution, which was eventually formalized in the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) 
set theory, is the paradigm of that which can be consistently thought; it presents the 
foundational discourse of what it is possible to think in our epoch. 
As Jean-Toussaint Desanti argues, in opting for the “intrinsic ontology” of ZF set 
theory there is a “price to be paid” in terms of the “reform of philosophical 
understanding” that Badiou wants to bring about, and has been working toward since 
the publication of Being and Event.18
                                                     
17 For a philosophical introduction to set theory see Mary Tiles, The Philosophy of Set Theory: An Historical 
Introduction to Cantor’s Paradise. New York, Dover Publications, 2004. 
 This is the question I have metaphorically tried to 
illustrate as the “Wherefore?” of philosophy. “Wherefore art thou?” is often 
caricatured or misunderstood as “Where are you?”, but in actual fact means “Why 
are you?” In attempting to advance his philosophical enterprise, his “system”, Badiou 
may be increasingly faced with a “fundamental question of ontology” which I would 
18 Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology of Alain Badiou” in Peter Hallward 
ed. Think Again. Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy. London, Continuum, 2004. 
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like to characterize as “Why philosophy?” or more precisely as “Why the need for 
philosophy?” Simply put, does the “reform of philosophical understanding” under 
consideration here extend so far as to endanger philosophy, or to render it obsolete, 
inadequate to the militant project of philosophy in itself? And would it be a positive 
development “for philosophy” if it were indeed rendered obsolete? Would it be in keeping 
with Badiou’s “immanent” philosophical radicalism if mathematics were capable of furnishing this 
philosophy intrinsically, or intramathematically i.e. with no need whatsoever for an “outside” (which 
would also relinquish the need for any “inside/outside” as well)?  
Let us note immediately that Badiou’s introduction to Being and Event certainly 
affirms the power of mathematics in the face of philosophy: 
Essentially, to affirm that mathematics completes ontology disconcerts 
philosophers because this thesis frees them absolutely from that which gave their 
discourse its centre of gravity, the last refuge of their identity. Today 
mathematics has in effect no need of philosophy, and thus, one may say, the 
discourse on being is perpetuated “all alone”. It is moreover characteristic that 
this “today” be determined by the creation of set theory, of mathematized logic, 
and then by the theory of categories and of topoi. 19
We must proceed with caution here since the word “philosophy” is precisely what 
is at stake:    
    
If philosophy – which is the disposition to designate the conjunction of being 
and of that-which-happens – was born in Greece it is because ontology 
established there with the first deductive mathematicians the required form of its 
discourse.20
Let us underline the fact that it is not within the power of philosophy to control 
this “conjunction”. Indeed, philosophy’s identity oscillates in Badiou’s text between 
those discourses of necessity, wherein the science of being qua being is the dominant 
condition for a philosophy which is nothing in itself apart from pure inconsistency; 
and those discourses of contingency whereby philosophy can only be conceived as 
absolutely other than being (“that-which-happens”). Perhaps this is the point where the 
“neo-classical” torsion of philosophy – combining what is new and old at the same 
time – is most pronounced in having to live up to the iconoclastic demands of 
philosophical modernism – “invention”, “novelty”, “transformation”, etc. – while also 
retaining the classical dimension of the margin, and the “separation” of philosophy 
from ontology. Then again, it seems far more striking on the evidence to admit that a 
false dichotomy may be at work here, since what are we to make of an allegedly 
 
                                                     
19 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 10—11 (p. 17) [Translation modified]. 
20 Ibid., p. 10 (p. 17) [Translation modified]. 
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militant philosophical project which declares the “history of truth”21 while having 
already made its peace with the poetic ontology of Heidegger i.e. while having 
acknowledged and internalized its own relation to the classical schema of philosophy 
from Plato to Heidegger? As Jean-Luc Nancy proposes, could we not equate the 
“history of truth” with metaphysical history? In which case, having had done with 
teleology, would we not end up in “natural history”?22
 Let me venture a tentative hypothesis at this stage that the “disposition to 
designate the conjunction” in Badiou’s theoretical enterprise, whereby philosophy is 
both internalized through the discourse of ZF set theory and externalized through the 
discourse of the event impedes the radical philosophical potential of said enterprise.   
    
This is not an anti-philosophical hypothesis. I am not seeking the means to topple 
idols all the better to propose “new” philosophical figures: new Robespierres, Cantors, 
Mallarmés, Romeos or Juliets. Indeed, the question of “novelty” (the word has a 
paradoxical connotation in English) is precisely one of the problems. Etienne Balibar 
has remarked at Badiou’s tautological definition of unicity.23 I would merely ask, if we 
accept the definition that “Any unique multiple can receive a proper name, such as 
Allah, Yahweh, Ø or ω 0”,24
                                                     
21 This quotation from Pascal is adopted by Badiou in meditation 21 of Being and Event.  
 how might a “new” Robespierre differ from an old one? 
Or, again following the definition, can it really be said that Romeo and Juliet’s love 
affair is a subject of truth? Is it so unthinkable for thinking to go to work directly on its 
material without the need for second-order naming or designation? Let us recall that 
in set theory first-order logic is governed by the predicate ∈, which in Being and Event 
Badiou refers to as the relation of “belonging”. This relation counts “objects” as pure 
sets irrespective of what the “objects” in question are. By contrast second-order logic 
interprets (or “extends”) the pure set-theoretical relations which prevail in first-order 
logic through statements of quantification of the type “for all P…” In the first-order 
logic we inhabit a universe where “everything” is a set, where pure multiplicity reigns, 
where there is nothing “in” sets but sets of sets of sets… and so on ad infinitum. Now, 
rather than seek to disable second-order logic on the assumption that pure 
unrestricted thinking is only possible on the basis of a “primitive” relation between 
sets, the problem here seems to relate more to philosophy’s role in legislating over the 
domains in which set theory may operate. For Badiou there are four philosophical 
discourses or “conditions”: love, art, politics, and mathematical science. But having 
unleashed the power of pure thinking inherent to set theory why then restrict this 
power to mathematical discourse and ontological situations? Why must “pure” 
22 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Philosophy without Conditions” in Think Again, pp. 42—43.  
23 Etienne Balibar, “The History of Truth: Alain Badiou in French Philosophy” in Think Again. 
24 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, p. 525 (p. 560). 
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thinking be ordained and restricted by a philosophical conception of set theory? Isn’t 
such a conception to the mutual detriment of both philosophy and set theory?  
IV: SPECULATIONS IN REALISM 
I am speculating on nothing here that cannot be inferred from Badiou’s text and from 
those instances where the radically un-conditioned and “unbound” nature of 
philosophy (to quote one of Badiou’s favoured expressions) raises its head. Here is one 
example of what I mean:   
In the end, nothing is more corrosive for philosophy than to separate itself from 
[the mathematized regime of existence], which creates, beyond that which can 
be empirically tested, the real of a simple possibility, and destines thought to the 
only thing that matters, its absolute identity with the being that it thinks.25
 Let us try to address some of the “corrosive” implications for philosophy of 
unleashing mathematical thinking on the world. Or, as Badiou quoting Mallarmé 
puts it, let us “address a ‘demand to the world that it adjust its dread to rich and 
numbered postulates’.”
  
26
According to Ray Brassier the “most radical impulsion of [Badiou’s] thinking” is 
its “veritable ontological nihilism”.
  
27 At a time when global capitalism is rapidly 
dispelling the myth that there may yet be some viable alternative to relentless over-
consumption, monetary-spiritual indebtedness and environmental destruction, 
Badiou’s idea that being is nothing provides an exercise, not in saving the world or 
even affirming the “best of all possible worlds”, but in thorough-going realism. For 
Brassier, Badiou belongs to the Enlightenment tradition of philosophy of pushing 
back the frontiers of human reason, even and especially into areas where human 
reason may not want to go; in other words, where the consequences of thinking may 
be damaging for human beings (and for thinking as such?), but where truth can 
nonetheless shed its light. As Brassier puts it, “Thinking has interests that do not 
coincide with those of living; indeed, they can and have been pitted against the 
latter.”28
Any number of examples could be used to illustrate this point, although the Paris 
Commune is the one Badiou often cites from the domain of politics. Here we have an 
  
                                                     
25 Alain Badiou, “Metaphysics and the Critique of Metaphysics” in Pli, 10 (2000), p. 184.  
26 Ibid. p. 190. 
27 Ray Brassier, “L’Anti-Phénomène – Présentation et Disparaître” in B. Besana and O. Feltham eds. 
Ecrits Autour de la Pensée d’Alain Badiou. Paris, L’Harmattan, 2007, p. 64.   
28 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound. Philosophy in the Age of Extinction. Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p.9 
[All page numbers refer to the unpublished typescript version].  
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instance of politics which unleashes or “unbinds” pure thinking from the mere 
interests and necessities of living. We might say that the question dominating the 
political sequence which ran from 18 March to the final week of May 1871 was far 
from that of mere survival in the face of overwhelming military odds. What “counted” 
for the citizens in that short-lived situation was rather nothing but the unrestricted 
capacities (the infinite multiplicity of their being) that went into building, defending 
and ultimately dying for an idea. The Commune in this sense was an infinite 
experiment in collective thinking.29
Athough apparently a dissimilar form of multiplicity we could also cite the 
instance of love in Romeo and Juliet which is completely indifferent – again 
“unbound” – to the established rules of courtship (namely, the respect for family 
honour). Romeo, in jumping over the wall of the Capulet estate to be with the girl he 
doesn’t even know is like the child animated by the Pied Piper of Hamelin’s seductive 
melody, and for whom the family bond has been irreparably broken. Romeo and 
Juliet might in this sense be described as an experiment in individuality (Badiou 
repeatedly refers to the individuals in a love affair as the subject of “the Two”
  
30
Here then are examples of pure thinking indifferent and unbound from the 
necessities and dangers of living, of “being-in-the-world”. But as far as philosophy is 
concerned we have a problem. Because what such highly creative formulations of 
individuality lack are the conceptual resources which establish them as highly creative 
formulations of individuality. Their originality as such (Badiou prefers the term 
“singularity”) as “historical” events is lost once we remind ourselves that what is 
counted as one by set theory is, in each and every situation, not “objects” but sets. 
There is no set theoretical means through which the specific elements of Romeo and 
Juliet’s romance in 16th century Verona might be distinguished, not just from a 
comparable romance also taking place in 16th century Verona, but from any other 
romance taking place anywhere else in the world – or in any other “possible world” – 
in time past, present or future. Let us just note in passing that, unlike Badiou, Leibniz 
did (at least early on in his career) argue the exact opposite: namely, that the 
individual histories of human civilization, despite its multiple diversity, could be 
faithfully recorded in books so as to count as one its eternal return, according to the 
laws of finite arithmetic:  
).  
If the human species survives sufficiently long in its present state then a time will 
come in which even the lives of individuals will recur in detail in the same 
                                                     
29 See Alain Badiou, “The Paris Commune: A Political Declaration on Politics” in The Communist 
Hypothesis, trans. D. Macey and S. Corcoran. London, Verso, 2010.  
30 See Alain Badiou, “What is Love ?” in Umbr(a) 1, 1996. 
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circumstances. For example, I myself – living in a city called Hanover, on the 
river Leine, working on the history of Brunswick, writing letters identical in 
meaning to the same friends…31
For Badiou, unlike the young Leibniz, the infinite multiplicity of any situation 
makes such description impossible – although Badiou does provide formulas or 
“prescriptions”, which he writes in set theory notation, for those truth domains or 
“generic procedures” which concern him (scientific, romantic, political, artistic). But 
the question here is this: does such prescription, rather than empirical description, 
succeed in confronting the world of sufficient reason as it really is? Is it really possible 
to unleash the “dread” of logical postulates on “the world” as such? Consider the 
following statement: 
  
Intellection is a contingent by-product of evolutionary history.32
The effect of this statement is somewhat unsettling when read in the context of the 
evolutionary hierarchies familiar to natural science. Such “evolutionary ladders” – 
with God at the apex – presume a divine purpose or “plan” for man’s place in the 
universe on the grand assumption that the human “intellect” is what elevates man 
above the animals. While not wishing to eschew a human or subjective capacity for 
rationality, and therefore an epistemic basis for thought,
   
33
For Badiou, mathematics is the discourse in which infinite multiplicity – pure 
inconsistent “matter” – is inscribed, and which today depends on the eight founding 
axioms of ZF set theory.
 in the continued absence of 
any empirical evidence for the exceptional ontological status of the human species as 
anything more than carbon-based life, such beliefs are mere superstitions. Man is 
matter. And matter is made up of compounds and atomic particles which, in turn, 
can be adequately formulated using mathematics. From a scientific realist or 
materialist point of view there is little else to be said about “man”. 
34
                                                     
31 Leibniz quoted in B. Madison Mount, “The Cantorian Revolution: Alain Badiou on the Philosophy of 
Set Theory” in Polygraph, 17 (2005), p. 77 [Translation modified].  
 However, Badiou’s conception of set theory poses a 
problem for our intuitive understanding of the world. To repeat, there are no 
empirical objects in set theory, only sets. And so our statement about the contingency 
of life on earth is, when viewed through Badiou’s optic, presumably no more or less 
“corrosive” or consequential for scientific discourse than the following statement:  
32 Ray Brassier, ibid. p. 156. 
33 In passing this is Brassier’s fundamental difference as a self-confessed “rationalist-naturalist” from 
Badiou, the latter on the contrary upholding that “thinking and being are the same.”  
34 Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice actually contains nine axioms and is referred to in 
shorthand as ZFC.   
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 89 
Not only does God play dice, but he sometimes throws them where they cannot 
be seen.35
 Badiou admits in Being and Event that his is “not a thesis about the world but about 
discourse.”
 
36
One further example of materialist speculation calls for attention here. In After 
Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux embarks on a philosophical critique of the Parmenedian 
axiom “being and thinking are the same”. What are the real consequences, 
Meillassoux insists, for thinking, in accepting this axiom? In short, that thinking can no 
longer countenance the “correlation” of primary and secondary qualities, or of things 
and their phenomena. For Meillassoux the real material stakes of science have for too 
long been obscured and tethered to redundant, albeit ultimately persuasive categories 
of metaphysical and alleged “post-metaphysical” philosophy (Meillassoux devotes a 
chapter to the regressive influence of fideism on metaphysics). The classic example of 
what Meillassoux terms “correlationism” is founded through Kant’s transcendental 
idealism according to which things are inconceivable “in themselves” but describable 
through the a priori forms of knowledge. But the mystical and obscurantist disrepute 
into which Enlightenment philosophy after Kant has fallen (Meillassoux cites 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein in this respect) is but a trivial aside when it comes to the 
crux of Meillassoux’s argument, which concerns the objectivity (he prefers the term 
“factiality”/ factualité) of modern science. After all, the “quaint beliefs of contemporary 
creationists” who defend in all seriousness the Bible’s assertion that God created the 
Earth 6000 years ago is enough to convince us today that science, not philosophy, is 
the more institutionally and discursively threatened, and is the one in danger of losing 
its authoritative status with regard to our understanding of the world.
 Could we infer from this that he wants to “save the world”? Do we 
detect in this apparent reluctance to engage with the data of empirical science a 
covert nostalgia for the world of his phenomenological adversaries? A nostalgia which 
impedes the radical, unbound implications of Badiou’s own philosophy? 
37
Factiality for Meillassoux rests on the scientific discovery of ancestral events which 
predate the emergence of both terrestrial life and consciousness, or of events relative 
to the very formation of the Universe itself. The “arche-fossil” – “materials indicating 
the existence of an ancestral reality or event” – therefore challenges the metaphysical 
prejudices of modern science, according to which the existence of the Universe is co-
rrelated, or only conceivable in relation to, the existence of observers. Needless to say 
 
                                                     
35 Stephen Hawking, unsourced quotation. 
36 Being and Event, p. 8.  
37 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier. London, 
Continuum, 2008.  
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the challenge posed by ancestrality extends far beyond the “all too human” 
transvaluation of values, or the anthropological horizon of man’s “being-in-the-
world”. The factiality which Meillassoux has in mind depends instead on the absolute 
contingency of Epicurean materialism, or of Chaos as such, the only “in itself” which 
truly is. Meillassoux’s ultimate challenge is therefore to arrive at a “principle of 
unreason” or of “thinking” which remains “by necessity” independent of the presumed 
laws of nature. “To assert the opposite, viz., that everything must necessarily perish, 
would be to assert a proposition that is still metaphysical.”38
Like Badiou, Meillassoux’s solution to the inconvenient fact that thinking may be 
unrelated to the existence of life on earth or of being-in-the-world is mathematics. As 
a former student of Badiou, Meillassoux follows the latter in drawing the 
philosophical implications from Cantorian set theory. Although there is insufficient 
space here for a thorough comparison of their respective positions, it seems that such 
implications are rather less restricted in scope for Meillassoux than they are for 
Badiou. For whereas the latter’s mathematico-ontological discourse is quite content to 
keep “the world” at arm’s length, Meillassoux’s aim is to “pass through the 
correlationist circle ... which separated thought from the great outdoors, the eternal 
in-itself, whose being is indifferent to whether or not it is thought.”
  
39 Indeed, on such 
criteria, Badiou’s application of ZF set theory – whose axiom of foundation forever 
suspends the thinking of pure multiplicity “on the edge of the void”40
V: PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT PHILOSOPHY
 – shows the 
extent of his philosophical conditioning and dependence on the transcendental 
idealism of Kant. What Meillassoux’s “critique of the Critique” promises, then, by 
way of radical contrast, is a philosophy freed from metaphysical conservatism, to the 
mutual benefit of both science and philosophy, mutually strengthened one might say 
by the realist and corrosive idea that we no longer depend on any world in which to 
think, and thus no longer on any such correlation. 
41
The moment has come to address the point that every reader of this essay will have 
surely understood by now: “Wherefore art thou Romeo?” is not a “romantic” 
statement at all, but a line of dialogue from Shakespeare’s most famous tragedy. Its 
 
                                                     
38 Meillassoux, p. 57. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Let me carefully clarify what I mean by saying that the axiom of foundation is what Badiou terms a 
“meta-ontological thesis” which institutes a “gap… between ontology and the thought of other 
presentations, or beings, or non-ontological presentations…” Being and Event, p. 188.    
41 Unfortunately there is insufficient space to address the “without-philosophy” (or sans-philosophie) of 
Gilles Grelet despite its influence on the few remaining remarks I am able to offer below.   
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discursive domain is not love, but art. The bearer of this statement and those of the 
other statements quoted here, which I used to illustrate the corrosive power of love as 
a procedure of pure thinking, are not real historical figures. Such individuals never 
existed; they are pure fictions. Romeo and Juliet exist only through the actors who 
incarnate the poetic sensibilities of Shakespeare’s text. But what of the statements 
themselves? Might they be legitimately transplanted from the domain for which they 
were intended – i.e. the domain of art – into that of love? Or are lovers – in lacking 
the kind of discursive propriety over their statements that never escaped the names 
Robespierre, Mallarmé or Cantor – forever destined to express their love in mundane 
and prosaic terms such as, “I love you” and “You mean the world to me”? In any 
case, what would qualify as “mundane” for a self-reflexive process for which no 
objective defining criteria exist? And, returning briefly to the language of our realist 
speculations: could there ever be love without a world in which to love?   
In Logics of Worlds, Badiou’s sequel to Being and Event, the author introduces the 
phenomenological criteria, or “transcendental algebra”, by which differences in 
degree or variations within “worlds” might be identified.42
that such and such a world precedes the existence of our species, and that, just 
like ‘our’ worlds, it stipulated identities and differences, and had the power to 
deploy the appearing of innumerable beings. This is what Quentin Meillassoux 
calls ‘the fossil’s argument’: the irrefutable materialist argument that interrupts 
the idealist (and empiricist) apparatus of ‘consciousness’ and the ‘object’. The 
world of the dinosaurs existed, it deployed the infinite multiplicity of the being-
there of beings, millions of years before it could be a question of a consciousness 
or a subject, empirical as well as transcendental.
 “We know from an 
indisputable source,” Badiou writes  
43
Now, this statement of approval, far from vouchsafing the evolution of Badiou’s 
philosophical system,
  
44
                                                     
42 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds: Being and Event Vol. 2, trans. Alberto Toscano. London, Continuum, 
2009. 
 would seem only to reinforce the argument regarding the 
corrosive power of mathematical thinking vis-à-vis “the world”, and the vacillation 
which this threat induces in Badiou’s philosophical method. Let us recall that 
philosophy for Badiou is both: 1) necessarily defined by the intrinsic mathematical 
discourse of being qua being, i.e. by the pure thinking of set theory – which, as we 
know, assumes the counting of infinite sets, rather than empirical objects; and 2) 
contingent in terms of the extrinsic evental discourse which conditions philosophy 
43 Ibid., pp. 118-19. 
44 On this point see Justin Clemens, “Had We But Worlds Enough, And Time, This Absolute 
Philosopher…” in Cosmos and History. The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol. 2, no. 1—2 (2006).  
 JASON BARKER 92 
through each of its four truth domains. Not only is such discourse non-descriptive but, 
as we have seen, in the domain of love the indifference of a romantic statement – both 
in terms of who is speaking and its signification – would even appear to threaten the 
pure generic status of Love (although of course this is not to deny that the cross-
fertilisation of art and love may also enhance love, albeit according to certain poetic 
conceptions).  
Is this what Badiou wants? Is the pure corrosive power of his thinking such that its 
effect is to undermine the experience of love to the point where even the individuals 
concerned become indifferent to the subject of its Two? Where love as such fuses into 
the exactitude of a pure matheme beyond “bare life”? If so, then Juliet’s suicide in the 
final act of Shakespeare’s play might be said to bring such thinking to a point of its 
logical completion: “O, happy dagger!” Juliet declares, “This is thy sheath; there rust, 
and let me die.”45
We could hardly conclude this essay without at least mentioning the discourse 
which Badiou places at the very heart of his formulations of love, i.e. psychoanalysis. 
Broadly speaking Badiou follows in the tradition of Jacques Lacan and structuralist 
psychoanalysis in drawing from the unconscious an ontological framework
  
46 through 
which those aspects of subjectivity traditionally reserved for philosophy, such as ethics 
and language, might be explored. But as Justin Clemens has noted the price of this 
integration might be rather threatening for philosophy since “psychoanalysis 
generates propositions that integrally affect philosophy”, whereas the reverse is not 
the case.47 Presumably this is why Badiou maintains that any philosophy worthy of the 
name must today first “traverse” the “antiphilosophy” of Lacan.48
Badiou confirms the “intimate relation” between love and art, and even extends 
the argument to the theatre, which is “politics and love, and more generally, the 
junction of the two [discourses]”. Romeo and Juliet is clearly one example of their cross-
fertilisation. Now, on the one hand such junctions do indeed seem to unleash the 
   
                                                     
45 Slavoj Žižek has written about suicide as a “real” ethical and political act. In classical Greek drama 
Žižek makes the point that rather than resulting from an unnatural obsession, Antigone’s suicide marks 
the authentic fulfillment of her desire. See Slavoj Žižek, Interrogating the Real, in R. Butler and S. Stephens 
eds. London, Continuum, 2006.     
46 Note that Jacques Lacan was famous for his life-long dismissal of ontology as a branch of philosophy. 
See Justin Clemens, “Love as Ontology: Psychoanalysis against Philosophy” in C. Kerslake and R. 
Brassier eds. Origins and Ends of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychoanalysis. Leuven, Leuven University 
Press, 2007. 
47 Justin Clemens, ibid. p. 186. 
48 Badiou’s reading of Lacan is rather more sophisticated than my caricature suggests. See Adrian 
Johnston, “This Philosophy Which is Not One: Jean-Claude Milner, Alain Badiou and Lacanian 
Antiphilosophy” in S: Journal of the Jan van Eyck Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique, 3 (2010).  
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corrosive power of pure thinking into undiscovered realms and promise us the 
“reform of philosophical understanding”. “There is no law of love,” Badiou 
confirms.49
Perhaps we should be wary of raising from the dead the metaphysical spectre of 
the End of Philosophy. Then again, would the end of “philosophy” necessarily spell 
the end of art, mathematical science, politics and love? Surely such practices would no 
more disappear “in themselves” with the end of philosophy than would “the world” 
itself disappear. This is the point that Shakespeare makes in another of his celebrated 
tragedies when Hamlet remarks that, “There are more things in heaven and earth, 
Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” However, for his part Badiou 
argues the exact opposite: 
 But if the freedom of pure thinking – “multiplicity unbound” – extends so 
far as to hybridize the generic truths that furnish philosophy with its conditions of 
possibility then, to return to our central question, “Wherefore art thou philosophy?” 
Why persist with philosophy at all?  
Not only, and contrary to what Hamlet declares, is there nothing in the world 
which exceeds our philosophical capacity, but there is nothing in our 
philosophical capacity which could not come to be in the reality of the world.50
If philosophy can be said to have a “future” – which is the title for an impressive 
collection of essays dedicated to Badiou’s work
  
51
 
 – then it seems to me that the 
question of this “future philosophy” is located precisely at this juncture, where the 
corrosive power of thinking pure, unbound multiplicity is unleashed both on the world 
and within the philosophy that brings the world into being. For what it’s worth my 
personal conviction is that Badiou’s intrinsic ontology makes any idea of the future, in 
these times of s(p)ecular Crisis and intellectual revisionism, seem rather gratuitous and 
superfluous to the militant task of thinking. I mean that as a compliment.  
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49 Alain Badiou and Nicolas Truong, Éloge de l’amour. Paris, Flammarion, 2009, p. 68.   
50 Alain Badiou, “Metaphysics and the Critique of Metaphysics”, ibid. p.189. 
51 Peter Hallward ed. Think Again. Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy. London, Continuum, 2004. 
